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Monday, July 13, 2009

The IMF/EU Commission Rift On Latvia Seems To Be Deepening

Two weeks ago I drew attention to a revealing press conference given by IMF First Deputy Managing Director John Lipsky and European Central Bank governing council member Christian Noyer where it seemed a rather different posture was being taken on the Latvian question than that which is being transmitted from Brussels. Then P O'Neill found a message on Twitter which suggested the topic of the Latvian budget had been unexpectedly added to the EcoFin agenda.

Today Bloomberg report that Barclays Capital’s chief economist for emerging Europe Christian Keller thinks that the IMF's posture of continuing to withhold funds even after the approval of the spending cuts “signaled that the rift between the IMF and EU has widened” .

Now I don't want to see connections were there are none, but it is a coincidence that Christian Keller works for the same Barclays capital whose Head of Emerging Markets Strategy Eduardo Levy-Yeyati recently published a lengthy analysis on the influential Is Latvia the new Argentina? - where he argued that: "The strategy of engineering an “internal” depreciation under a peg in Latvia (via contractionary fiscal policy, wage cuts and price deflation) implicit in the IMF program is proving too painful, if not self-defeating as in the 2001 collapse of Argentina’s currency board"

Now the publication of this article was interesting since Eduardo Levy-Yayati is not just any old economist. Previous to joining Barclays Capital, as his Voxeu biography informs us, he was

"a Senior Financial Sector Advisor for Latin America & the Caribbean at The World Bank. Previously, a Senior Research Associate at the Inter-American Development Bank, the Director of Monetary and Financial Policies and Chief Economist for the Central Bank of Argentina, and the Director of the Center for Financial Research and Professor of Economics and Finance at Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. He has also worked as consultant for the IMF, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, among many public and private institutions. His research on emerging markets banking and finance has been published extensively in top international economic journals. "


That is, SeƱor Levy-Yayati is an extremely experienced economist, an old Argentina hand, and enjoys some considerable influence over emerging markets issues in Washington. So was the appearance of the article in Voxeu at the end of June totally coincidental? He certainly is experienced enough to know what he is doing in these matters. And was it also a coincidence that only a week later former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund Ken Rogoff - surely another person who knows perfectly well what he is doing - gave an interview where he said that "Latvia should devalue the lats to avoid a worsening of its economic crisis" and that "the IMF made the wrong decision when it allowed Latvia to keep its currency peg"?

The IMF cannot say what it really thinks for obvious reasons, but could we construe Levy-Yayati and Rogoff as thinking out loud on the funds behalf?

The clash between the two institutions (should such a clash exist) derives from “ideological differences” according to Keller. "The IMF is focused on economic questions such as the sustainability of the currency peg, the use of economic stimulus or the idea of fast-track euro adoption......The EU’s main concern is political, such as euro-adoption rules and the implementation of convergence programs".

This all rings pretty true, and it rings even truer when you note that the Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Dombrovskis said only last week that the country "may not need the IMF share of the financing". As Keller says, “The Latvia program has become a headache for the IMF.”

Postscript

Latvian foreign trade was down again in May, at 618.3 mln lats it was 4.2% (or 27.1 mln lats) lower than it was in April (no green shoot here) and 38.5% (or 387.6 mln lats) down on May last year, according to provisional data of Latvian Statistics Office. May exports were down 30.1% over May 2008, while imports were down an incredible 43.7%. Over the January – May period foreign trade was down by 35.4% on the same period in 2008. Exports were down by 27.7% and imports by 39.9%.






Industrial output fell back again in May over April, by 0.4% on a seasonally adjusted basis according to the statistics office. Year on year it was down 19.3%.





And domestic demand continues to weaken. Retail sales were down 0.48% in May over April, and 24.14% year on year, according to Eurostat data.





Latvia’s inflation rate fell to 3.4 percent in June, the lowest annual rate since October 2003, from 4.7 percent in May. Prices were down 0.5% on the month, but this is way too slow for the kind of internal devaluation process which is underway. At this rate the loss of GDP will be truly massive before the internal currency correction has taken place.

There were 206,000 people unemployed in Latvia in May, or 16.3 percent of the labour force, according to the latest Eurostat data. This is slightly down on earlier data, but since these results are survey based, and such rapid changes make it difficult to apply such methodologies, I don't think we need suspect any kind of "foul play". The rise is dramatic enough as it is, as can be seen in the chart below. This makes me wonder were we will be by mid 2010.




One area where the central bank has had some success has been in getting overnight interbank lending rates down again, and the overnight Rigibor is now back around 3% (13 July), but the 12 month rates are still very high (20.2% 13 July) which does suggest that while market participants are fairly sure the peg is safe in the short term, they are not at all convinced about what is going to happen in the longer term. And in this they seem to be making a valid judgement, since this is the situation at the time of writing.






Meatime Latvia's natality continues to suffer under the weight of the crisis, there were 1750 live births in May, down 15.3% on May 2008. Thus, not only are we playing with the countries short term future here, we are also putting the possibility of having a long term one at risk.




Where Is The Endgame?

When it comes to the short term dynamics of the looming currency crisis in Emerging Europe, one of the Baltic Three, probably Latvia, will most likely be the first to concede its peg, as Eduardo Levy-Yeyati says this is just too painful, and the loss of GDP which is taking place while the politicians are dithering is fearful.

But when Latvia does leave its peg, then others are almost bound to follow. Everything depends on whether the EU Commission and the IMF are proactive or limit themselves to a mere reactive, problem-containment role. If the Latvian currency realignment is done in an organised and systematic fashion, then it may, even at this late date, be a containable process. For this to happen the EU Commission have to stop playing with the politics of the situation, realise that the Maastricht criteria were not written in tablets of stone, and start to formulate a reasonable exit stratgey for all the Eastern members of the EU. They need, that is, to start thinking practical economics, the way the IMF now seem to be doing. The macro economics of this was always clear and straightforward.

But if the Latvian situation is simply left to fester, and the country falls into the grip of a growing political anarchy, then containment will be much more difficult, since panic will more than likely set in.

A similar situation pertains in Bulgaria (see my latest post on Bulgaria, since the similatities are evident). Absent a Latvian devaluation, it is not unthinkable that the Lev peg may be maintained in Bulgaria for another year or so. But if the Bulgarian authorities do go down this road, then we face the severe risk of a a further raggedy ending, since the problem is not one of sustaining the peg, but of restoring competitiveness and economic growth, and this is much more difficult without a formal devaluation. And if Bulgaria does go hurtling off that cliff on which it is currently perched, then just be damn careful it doesn't drag half of South Eastern Europe careering after it. The EU Commission need to begin to resolve this mess, and the need to begin now!

4 comments:

Velo said...

I'm really appreciate for deep focus of the actual situation in Baltic. But you should look back to the history to estimate future.
These countries survived after the loss of more than 50% of GDP during the 4 years after independence 1991-94.
http://www.balticdata.info/lithuania/macro_economics/lithuania_macro_economics_gdp.htm
Particularly Lithuania reached GDP level of 1990 only in 2005.
These countries when trough occupations, civil war, deportations and emigrations in '40s that still in the memories of living persons.
So from the point of survivors I could say - we can do many things again.

Anonymous said...

"But when Latvia does leave its peg, then others are almost bound to follow."

Why?
Could you, please, explain this point?

Edward Hugh said...

Hello,

"But when Latvia does leave its peg, then others are almost bound to follow."

Well basically, becuase this is just how financial crises work. The thing is, by unrealistically trying to hang on to the peg, Latvia exposes itself to everyone who wants to bet they won't be able to, and a tug of war begins. Financial markets work like this. The thing is, if the policy was a credible one, the ones who want to bring the peg down (not me, I hasten to add, I am an economist, not a financial market participant) would soon get tired of losing money and desist. But it is not credible, and the situation has deteriorated, so they are enboldenend. I think most external market participants now think the peg will go, but not yet.

If you look at the RIGIBOR rates, you find the twelve month rates are still very high, while the overnight ones are now very low. This means devaluation risk minimal immediately, and very high one year from now. This may be right or wrong, but it is a market judgement. Basically the only unknown is just how long the Latvian man or woman in the street will be able to stand the pain.

So when Latvia "falls", these market participants will look for fresh earnings, and chose the country which looks the next most vulnerable (perhaps Bulgaria, or perhaps Lithuania) and so on.

Now you could say, these investors, what a reprehensible bunch they are. Well I have no comment here, since I am simply an economist, and my analysis does not normally involve making moral judgements of others. I do not take the view that the market system is perfect, simply that it is the best we have so far invented. "We" being the human species here.

The thing is, you should never quarrel with market participants if you have a policy which won't work. That is where all this started to go wrong.

Now decisions are being taken by the EU Commission on a political rather than an economic basis and the IMF are starting to take their distance.

More reasons why the others will follow. Basically look at trade connections, a substantial devaluation in Latvia would make goods leaving Latvia much cheaper. This would immediately have an impact in Estonia and Lithuania. And so on.

After the peggars, the action will move to Romania and Hungary, since they (crazily) are also trying to practice a form of internal devaluation by maintaining their currency value using very high interest rates, rates which are ridiculous when you consider the strength of the contraction these countries are facing. And the reason they are doing this? All those forex denominated housing loans. Really the policy of letting so many people have housing loans in a currency which wasn't their own has to have been one of the dumbest things anyone has done, ever.

Basically, you need to appreciate, this crisis isn't done yet, not by a long stroke. I am anticipating another "Lehmann type" event in either Eastern or Southern Europe (you can take your pick of countries, candidates are not hard to identify) between now and 2011, and of course this appreciation in part conditions my phrase you picked up on, since it gives a kind of contextual background.

Anonymous said...

Lithuania GDP has reached level of 1990 only in the 2005, so 1987 would be acceptable level for the most of the population.
All these rumors about change in peg is cooked by the swedish banks. They profiting from all this mess and taking over the nice assets in Baltic.
There is a little sense in peg change as unit labor costs here still very low comparing with export markets.
Peg change should go via parlament in LT that surely will cause early elections and other political mess. Who will take responsibility to start this?

Estonia At A Glance January 2008

Welcome to the Baltic Economy Watch Blog. Below you will find the normal chronological blog posts. But first we would like to present some charts which provide background data and which we hope will help the first time reader better assess and get to grips with the argument being presented here. The only really big question about the EU10 economies as we enter 2008 is - among the more vulnerable ones (the Baltics, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary) - who will be the first to go over the edge of the chasm which seems to lie out in front. Basically we have two sets of curves to look at. One set go up, and these essentially refer to prices and wages. The other set go down, and they refer to levels of domestic economic activity and consumer and producer confidence. We hope you will find the background data presented here useful in assessing the argument which we are presenting on this blog, which is basically that a key component in the emerging economic crisis which is arriving in Russia and much of Eastern Europe has its roots in the underlying demographics. Basically after years of low fertility, and in many cases out migration, there is just not the labour supply available to fuel rapid catch up growth without provoking strong inflationary pressures. We feel the evidence here is just to strong and to widespread to ignore. In the long run fertility does matter. Please click on thumbnails for better viewing.

Estonia's inflation rate rose in December to a nine-year high, led by food and housing costs. But we can already see that producer prices (lead by export producer prices which have been falling since the summer) have started to ease in October and November. This could be read as a first indicator for what is to come, since if there is a hard landing inflation will not be sustained-

GDP growth, which was of course strong, is now slowing, and unemployment, which has been trending steadily downwards, should really start to increase at some point. This will mean, basically, that the days when Estonia urgently needed to import migrant workers to try and avoid the huge spike in wages and prices which we have seen is now largely passed.

Private domestic consumption has almost certainly peaked, and is now in rapid decline. This is evident from the reatail sales data, and from the reducing number of notarial property contracts, which are a reasonable indication of the state of the housing market. So what happens next?


Well obviously this is now completely unsustainable, especially given that the EU10 and Eurozone countries (not to mention the UK) are all themselves likely to slow significantly during 2008. So now a hard landing seem unavoidable. How will this manifest itself? Basically we should expect to see increasing pressure on the Kroon currency peg, a pressure which, in the short term at least, the Estonian authorities will try and resist.


When I say that the time for fomenting rapid inward migration is now past this does not mean that in terms of longer term stability Estonia does not need to focus on raising fertility and attracting new citizens from elsewhere to compensate for those who have simply not been born: What I am getting at is that all of these issues will now take rather a back seat as the short term dynamics increasingly take over.

Unfortuantely opportunities have been lost, but there is no point in going back over old arguments. One measure of the very difficult situation Estonia will now in all probability find itself in is that the policy priority will now need to switch from attracting migrants to retaining the young workers it already has and avoiding an uptick in out migration.


The extent to which this will prove possible will depend on the level of distress which Estonia's citizen are faced with at the end of the day, and this depends on exactly how hard the hard landing turns out to be.


2008 Forecasts:Forcasts as such really go out of the window at this point, since pretty soon none of them will be worth the paper - or spreadsheet - they have been written on.

Once we see the measure of the problem we will be able to start to think about policy measures to help move forward. This is not the end of the world, but it is going to be a bumby ride and serious structural damage will be done. So all I can say is, fasten your seatbelts.

This blog will not have daily update posts on Estonia or the other Baltic countries (where the situation is not that different), until or unless events start to move at a pace which makes these desireable. There will be data updates from time to time, and extensive monthly reports, the next of which (for Estonia) will be at the start of February. I also recommend my two recent extenisive summary posts from Claus Vistesen:


Catch Up Growth and Demographics - Evidence from Eastern Europe
Translation Risk in the Baltics and other matters on Eastern Europe